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APPLICABLE LAW IN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: ICSID CONVENTION, 
ARBITRATION RULES AND EUROPEAN UNION LAW 
 
Abstract 
The law applicable to arbitral proceedings in general, and to investor-State arbitral disputes in particular, has always been a 
conundrum. This is for a simple reason: arbitral proceedings are detached from any national legal system.  
Given this, the question raised is how to let arbitrators determine the applicable law for the dispute. The solution provided by 
arbitral clauses enacted within arbitral rules of procedures, or investment treaties, are slightly different. Namely, the freedom 
conferred upon the arbitral tribunal to determine the applicable law, absent any party’s choice, has raised much debate among 
both academics and the jurisprudential praxis. This paper aims to reopen the debate on the lex applicable in investor-State 
dispute settlements. After providing some historical background on arbitral proceedings, along with the interpretation and 
application given to ICSID Convention art. 42.(1), the analysis will then show that the recent arbitral praxis has had to tackle 
a third set of laws. Reference will be made to European union law, questioning whether and how arbitral tribunals should apply 
European law in disputes arising out of so-called intra-EU BITs or the Energy Charter Treaty. Some conclusions on the 
relationship between international and European law will then be attempted.  
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1. INTRODUCTION   
 
The investor-state dispute settlement is an arbitral dispute resolution mechanism 
which is an alternative to national jurisdiction1. 
Its origin dates back to when, in 1959, the first bilateral investment treaty (BIT) was 
signed between Germany and Pakistan. Both parties agreed to get rid of national 
court competence, favoring as alternative forums either the International Court of 
Justice or an ad hoc arbitral tribunal. The latter would have had the competence to 
hear and solve all disputes arising out of the parties’ investment relationship. Over 
the years, the investor-state arbitral dispute resolution mechanism has become the 
most frequent option agreed on by parties and has been enacted within investment 
treaties, both bilateral and multilateral.  
This choice has implied two consequences: on one side, the investor’s home state 
has given up its power to protect its investor through either diplomatic protection or 
through domestic proceedings. On the other side, the host state has agreed to confer 
competence to rule over its measures to a third forum: the arbitral one. However, 
state sovereignty has always been preserved thanks to the customary international 
rule prescribing the exhaustion of local remedies2. According to this, foreign 
investors seeking redress for any infringement allegedly caused by the host State 
must first pursue the claims in the host state’s jurisdiction. Only then, in case of a 
lack of redress, is the investor allowed to start arbitral proceedings. 
The rationale behind the investor-state arbitral proceeding choice is easy to 
understand: it reflects a disbelief of the national judicial system. This disbelief has a 
historical background: the first round of investment agreements was signed between 
developed and developing countries and the judicial systems within the latter were 
                                               
1 Billiet J. (2016); Rubino-Sammartano M. (2001)  
 
2 See Brauch M.D. (2017); Foster, G. K. (2011); D’Ascoli, S., Scherr, K. M. (2007); Klafter B. (2005); Cançado Trindade, 
A. A. (1983). 
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not considered to abide by international principles of procedural law such as the right 
of defense, the right to be heard and the right to have a third and impartial judge.  
From this the decision was derived to confer competence to hear disputes (those 
precisely defined in the arbitral clause) upon an arbitral tribunal. Firstly, arbitral 
tribunals operate outside of any legal system; suffice to say that they are legitimized 
by the arbitral clause enacted in the investment treaty itself. Secondly, they guarantee 
a procedure which abides by the international principles of procedural law. In this 
regard, two options soon became available; namely, the arbitral clause can refer to 
either ad hoc arbitration (applying the arbitral rules of procedures chosen in the 
arbitral clause, such as the UNCITRAL Model Law); or the arbitral clause can refer 
to institutional mechanisms of dispute resolution (such as those provided by the 
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 1959, ICSID). 
Frequently, an arbitral clause gives investors the choice to decide between both 
options, the ad hoc and the institutional.  
Along with rules of procedure, the arbitral clause confers upon the parties the 
freedom to determine which law will regulate the dispute. This freedom has a very 
strong implication when made available within investment proceedings. As 
mentioned above, arbitral tribunals are separate from legal systems therefore neither 
national nor international provisions, to which the national system has adapted to, 
are applicable, ex se, to the proceedings. The choice of law is then fundamental 
because it can determine the outcome of the case. 
Given the above, the issue of the applicable law in investor-state arbitration is not a 
new one. During the last decades both academics and arbitral case law have debated 
on it. Namely, the debate has, for a long time, focused on the relationship between 
the proper national and/or international law provisions to apply to the case3.  
Recent praxis seems to have reinvigorated the debate and, in fact, a third legal system 
option is now applicable and is in competition with the other two, namely the 
European union.  
The new role played by the European union within the investment field has a 
historical background. In 2009, the Lisbon Treaty conferred, upon the EU, 
competence for foreign direct investments (FDI). As a consequence, the European 
union has been playing a leading role in substituting member state investment 
policies with a European one (the extra-EU BITs have not caused much concern)4. 
Viceversa, the maintenance into force of the intra-EU BITs have raised much debate5. 
                                               
3 See Barcelona Traction Light and Powered Limited (Belgium v. Spain), I.C.J. Judge Morelli, separate opinion, 5th February 
1970, Reports, 1970, 222, at 233.  
 
4 See Regulation (EU) No. 1219/2012 of the European Parliament and of the council of 12th December 2012 establishing 
transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member States and third countries, OJ L 351, 
20.12.2012. 
 
5 See Vienna Convention on the law of the treaties concluded in Vienna on 23 May 1969, UN doc. n. 18232, in: United 
Nations Treaty series, at 331, available here : https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201155/volume-1155-i-
18232-english.pdf 
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The debate is now over, with the member states having reached an agreement on a 
plurilateral treaty for the termination of all the approximately 190 intra-EU BITs 6.  
However, while the legal value of the intra-EU BITs is still uncertain, numerous 
arbitral proceedings have been raised relating to their alleged infringement or to that 
of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), signed by the EU, the member states, and third 
countries. The facts at stake have always been the same, and the key issue concerns 
the relationship between the sources of law allegedly applicable to the pending 
proceeding: European and international. Each arbitral tribunal has thus scrutinized 
whether, according to the rules of the law applicable to the proceeding, it should 
consider the European or the international law as the applicable law. This, in turn, 
has meant, and still means, questioning whether or not European union law applies 
when the parties to the intra-EU BIT have not made an expression of choice of law. 
In light of the above premises, this paper aims to reopen the debate on the lex 
applicable in investor-state arbitral proceedings, focusing on new doubts raised by 
recent arbitral praxis. The next paragraph provides a general overview of the tools 
used by the arbitral tribunal to determine the applicable law. In this regard, attention 
will be paid to the applicable law provision enacted in both ad hoc and institutional 
arbitral procedural rules (para 2). The analysis will then focus on ICSID art. 42(1), 
first alinea, examining the role of the arbitral tribunals in cases where parties have 
expressed their optio legis (para.3). Then, this paper will analyze art. 42(1) second 
alinea, scrutinizing how the old arbitral praxis was interpreted and applied. At the 
beginning, the latter was used in a subsidiary way (para. 4). Then subsequent 
paragraphs will retrace the evolution of interpretation after the decision in the Wena 
Hotel annulment proceeding. Since then a new praxis has evolved, aimed at 
legitimizing the autonomy of international law (para. 5). The analysis will then focus 
on the relationship with the corpora iuridica, which may be applicable in a dispute 
arising out of an intra-EU BIT or out of the ECT. Special attention will be given to 
the potential struggle between the contents of these two bodies of law (European and 
international) where these are equally applicable. In this regard, two main questions 
arise: firstly, whether or not a real conflict exists between international and European 
provisions and, secondly, which law prevails for the host-member state involved. 
This paper will also question whether the European union primauté applies to 
international law (para.6) and the last paragraph will scrutinize how the EU is now 
pursuing its external investment policy with third countries. Accordingly, this paper 
will examine the legitimacy of the arbitral clause, included in new European 
investment treaties. Reference will be made to the recent decision of the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) in the so-called Achmea case (C-284/18) along with the 
Opinion 1/17 (para. 7). Some conclusions will then be attempted (para.8).  
 
2. THE ROLE OF ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL IN DETERMINING THE LAW APPLICABLE TO AN 
INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRAL DISPUTE  
                                               
6 The Statement is available at the following link : 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/business_economy_euro/banking_and_finance/documents/191024-bilateral-
investment-treaties_en.pdf ;  to get a leaked version of the agreement see http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/48/2019/12/a-draft-agreement-has-been-leaked.pdf;   Lavranos N. (2019). 
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When a dispute arises out of an investment agreement and the claimant starts a 
proceeding in front of an arbitral tribunal, either ad hoc or institutional, arbitrators 
have the power to, firstly, recognize and confirm their competence and secondly, to 
deal with the issue of the applicable law. The determination of the applicable law is 
of fundamental importance to an arbitral dispute since the law applied may affect the 
outcome of the dispute. In fact, the law regulates how the obligations agreed on by 
the parties shall be interpreted and performed.  
This determination depends on numerous factors. 
Firstly, the arbitral tribunal has to understand the claims relevant to the proceedings. 
If they are contractual claims, and the treaty enacts an umbrella clause, arbitrators 
will scrutinize the contract signed by the investor and the host state7. Frequently, 
contract claims do not raise much concern, because the parties agree to subsume their 
contractual relationship to the national law of the host state. Besides, in the case of 
treaty claims, arbitrators look at the arbitral clause enacted within the treaty. On close 
scrutiny, the clause itself can be framed in two ways.  It can include an express choice 
of law made by the parties, or it can leave the choice up to the arbitral tribunal. In 
this latter scenario, the international rules of arbitral procedure instruct arbitrators on 
how to make their choice from amongst the available sources of law. A few examples 
of the most frequently used arbitral clauses from both ad hoc and institutional arbitral 
procedures, might be of help in this regard.  
With regards to the former, the UNCITRAL arbitral rules of procedure provide, in 
art. 35.1, that the arbitrator “shall apply the rules of law designated by the parties 
[…	] Failing such designation by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law 
which it determines to be appropriate” 8. As such, both parties and arbitrators have 
the freedom to decide which law to apply. The former are free to decide from 
amongst all the “rules of law” available. This means that parties can pick from both 
national law provisions and rules of law which are separate from any national legal 
system (such as, for instance, the lex mercatoria9). In the absence of either party’s 
choice, arbitrators can choose from amongst the sources of law they deem more 
appropriate to the controversy.  
Regarding institutional arbitral mechanisms, the first to mention is the ICSID 
Convention art. 42(1), according to which “the Tribunal shall decide a dispute in 
accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. In the absence 
of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State party to 
the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of international 
                                               
7 See Hamida (2006), p. 53 ss.; Wälde (2005), p. 183; Crespi Reghizzi (2009); Mauro M.R. (2004); Alexandrov (2004); See 
Sinclair (2004), p. 411.Gaillard E., Banifatemi Y. (2009). See also Moshe H. (1993), Gaillard (E.), 1991. To some case law 
praxis see: Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID case n. ARB/87/3, award 
of June 27 1990; Generation Ukraine Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID case n. ARB/00/9 award of 16 September 2003; CMS Gas 
Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID case ARB/01/8, award of 12 May 2005; Vivendi Universal v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID case n. ARB97/3, award of 21 November 2000.  
 
8 United Nation Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL Arbitration rules, 15th August 2010 (revised). 
 
9 Boschiero N. (2005); Konradi W., Fix-Fierro H. (2005); Marrella F. (2003). 
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law as may be applicable”10. Art. 42(1) distinguishes between two scenarios: on one 
side, the parties explicitly decide the rules of law that the arbitrator will be bound to 
apply. On the other hand, art. 42(1) acknowledges that, absent any choice, the arbitral 
tribunal will apply the law of the state party to the dispute. 
Analogous freedom to choose from amongst rules of law is also embraced by other 
arbitral rules of procedures enacted within institutional arbitral mechanisms. 
Reference is made to art. 21 of the International Chamber of Commerce arbitration 
rules according to which “the parties shall be free to agree upon the rules of law to 
be applied. In the absence of any such agreement, the arbitral tribunal apply the 
rules of law which it determines to be appropriate”11. Also, art. 27 of the Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce arbitral rules of procedures states that “the Arbitral Tribunal 
shall decide the merits of the dispute on the basis of the law(s) or rules of law agreed 
upon by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Arbitral Tribunal shall 
apply the law or rules of law that it considers most appropriate”12. In both cases, 
absent any explicit choice of law, arbitrators are free to determine the law they deem 
appropriate in order to solve the dispute. 
According to the above provisions, in case a dispute arises out of an intra-EU BIT, 
European union law can also be invoked, either as the law chosen directly by the 
parties or applied as part of the national or the international law that arbitrators deem 
appropriate. This second option is possible because of the “multi-sided” nature of the 
European union: it forms a part of both member states’ national laws and 
international law. Indeed, the European union is grounded in the so-called 
fundamental treaties, which are international treaties. More precisely, the European 
union can be described as "an ordre juridique d’origine internationale "13. 
Besides, there are also some international treaties which include an arbitral clause. 
Accordingly, they provide a procedural framework within which any dispute 
between the parties has to be decided. The North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) provides in art. 1131 that “A tribunal established under this Section shall 
decide the issues in dispute in accordance with this agreement and applicable rules 
of international law”; the second paragraph also makes clear that any interpretation 
on the agreement provided by the Commission on Free Trade “shall bind the 
Tribunal”14. This provision certainly reduces arbitral freedom of interpretation as 
arbitrators are bound to apply NAFTA substantive provisions, as interpreted by the 
Commission (along with any applicable international rules). However, a uniform 
interpretation increases the chance of having the same factual situation decided in 
                                               
10 See the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID Convention Arbitration Rules, 1st January 
1968, art. 42(1). 
 
11 ICC Rules of Arbitration, ICC, 1st of March 2017 (revised).  
 
12 Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Arbitration Rules, 2017 (revised). 
 
13 Kadi e Al Baraakat International Foundation v. the Council and the Commission, ECJ in cases C-402/05 & C-425/05, 
Opionion of AG P. Maduro, 16 January 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:11, para. 21. Cfr. D. ALLAND D. (2001),  pp. 47-59 
 
14 North America Free Trade Agreement, signed 17 December 1992, Ch. 11.  
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the same way which, in turn, reduces the need to determine the correct interpretation 
of the treaty or law to be applied. 
With regards to other experiments of regionalization, it is interesting that the new 
European investment agreements do include an arbitral clause15. Regarding the 
applicable law, the Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA) signed 
between Europe, the member states and Canada and now under provisional 
application provides, in art. 8.31, that “1. the Tribunal shall apply this Agreement as 
interpreted in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and 
other rules and principles of international law applicable between the Parties”16. 
Lastly, it is worth mentioning the arbitral clause framed in art. 26 of the ECT, 
according to which “a tribunal established […] shall decide the issues in dispute in 
accordance with this Treaty and applicable rules and principles of international 
law”17.  
As with the NAFTA and the CETA, the ECT also includes substantive provisions 
applicable to disputes, thus reducing the parties’ freedom to refer to other sources of 
law. Only in case of need may international law and principles become of any 
relevance. Interestingly to note, arbitral provisions such as those enacted within the 
above-mentioned multilateral investment treaties, introduce a certain dialogue 
between particular laws (enacted within the treaty itself) and general ones (the 
international law provisions potentially relevant to the case). The combination of 
these two sources of law renders the host state’s national law useless. Conferring 
such a residual role (or even none) upon the host state’s national law also implies an 
indirect harmonization of decisions taken18. In fact, all analogous claims will be 
scrutinized with the same substantive provisions, while national law will be 
mentioned only as a fact. The basic requirement for this type of intransitive, or 
informal, harmonization in law, is “effectuating as understanding of different legal 
concepts”19. 
 
3. ICSID ART. 42.(1) OR, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND 
NATIONAL LAW. THE OPTIO LEGIS 
 
From the analysis so far developed it seems that, despite some slight differences, all 
arbitral rules of procedure confer, upon the arbitral tribunal, the duty to follow 
parties' choice or, in the absence of this, the power to freely make their own.  
                                               
15 Glenn P. (2001), p. 1789; Bauman Z. (2000). 
 
16 See Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European union and its Member 
States, signed on the 16th October 2016, since 21st September 2017 under provisional application, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf  
 
17 See Energy Charter Treaty of 17th December 1994, available at 
https://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/Legal/IEC_EN.pdf 
 
18 Glenn P. (2001), p. 1793. 
 
19 David R. (1968), p. 15. 
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This and the following paragraph focus on the functioning of ICSID art. 42.(1) first 
and second alinea. This provision has indeed raised much debate on the relationship 
between international and national law which may be applicable to the dispute. This 
issue has interested both academics and arbitral case law, but neither has yet found a 
definitive answer. The debate should now be reopened because the role potentially 
played by European union law should be scrutinized in both scenarios: in the case of 
an express choice of law by the parties or absent this. 
Art. 42.(1) first alinea deals with the case where parties have expressed their choice 
of law. Parties’ freedom is broad, given that they can pick from the rules of law as 
they prefer. Plus, the provision does not require that the parties’ agreement has to be 
expressed and in written form. Interestingly to note, during the drafting of the ICISD, 
the Convention Committee highlighted that a tribunal could be bound to apply the 
rules of law which derive by an implicit agreement which could be deduced from the 
facts and circumstances of the relationship between the parties20.  
Following a literal interpretation of the provision, the application of European union 
law should not be in doubt. In fact, academics and case law unanimously conclude 
that the expression "rules of laws” (which is found in the English version 21and not 
"laws"), confers upon the parties the right to refer to non-state rules also. This means 
that it is sufficient that the parties choose rules which are enacted within either a 
judicial legal system (the European union) or a social group (lex mercatoria).  
However, the role of the European union may change depending on how the arbitral 
tribunal interprets the parties’ choice of law.  It suffices here to recall the Duke 
Energy v. Equador award where the arbitral tribunal reasoned on how broadly it had 
to interpret the optio legis made by the parties. Indeed, the clause included in the 
investment agreement stated that the arbitral tribunal would determine the investment 
dispute “under the laws of Ecuador and the applicable principles of international 
law […] the standard of review being based on the terms of the BIT22. The question 
was whether or not the parties, when deciding that the principles of international law 
were applicable to the dispute, meant to include the BIT provisions too 23. This doubt 
was legitimate because the investment treaty’s praxis counts numerous BITs in 
which the arbitral clause clearly states that the BIT provisions are applicable along 
with “the principles of international law”24 or “the applicable rules of international 
                                               
20 Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states, documents concerning 
the origin and the formulation of the convention, Vol. II, Part 1, ICSID publication (2009), at. 570. 
 
21 The Spanish version repeats verbatim the English one, referring to “aquellas normas de derecho international” while the 
French formulation raises confusion, referring to: “les principes de droit international en la matière”. 
 
22 Duke Energy Electroquil Partners & Electroquil S.A. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID case no. ARB/04/19, Award, 18 
august 2008, par. 191.  
 
23 Gaillard E., Banifatemi Y. (2003). 
 
24 See the BITs of: Argentina, Belgium, Luxembourg, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Spain, (the BIT with Mexico is 
excluded).  
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law”25. The BIT in the Duke Energy case did not include such a stipulation, therefore 
the arbitral tribunal considered whether or not it should apply the BIT provisions to 
determine whether they were breached by the State measure allegedly impairing 
investors’ rights. If used as a standard of review, the BIT provisions might have led 
the arbitral tribunal to question whether the measure abided by the substantive 
provisions of the BIT interpreted and applied in line with international law. 
Viceversa, BIT provisions would have been applied “only as the susbstantive 
framework for the resolution of the dispute” 26.  
Given this scenario, the arbitral tribunal decided that a double scrutiny was required. 
Firstly, the state’s measure was to be read together with the host state’s national law 
(and whether this was legitimate or not); then, in case of a positive answer, the 
arbitral tribunal would have to decide whether the measure was in line with, for 
instance, the standard of treatment as provided in the BIT. Therefore, the provisions 
included in the BIT were deemed to be part of the international rules referred to in 
the arbitral clause. The arbitral tribunal’s finding seems reasonable given that it treats 
the BIT as a truly international source of law which might also include some 
international principles of law27.  
Given this, in a case where a dispute arises out of an intra-EU BIT, the decision to 
apply the BIT’s substantive provisions as a standard of review might preclude 
European union law application because the BITs provisions will be interpreted and 
applied according to international law. This also precludes the application of the 
European standard of protection, which could be applicable if the arbitrators decided 
to apply international law. 
 
4. …follow: ICSID ART. 42(1), SECOND ALINEA 
 
ICSID Convention art. 42.(1) second alinea works as a choice of law clause given 
that it confers upon the arbitral tribunal the power to determine the law to apply. The 
provision was originally drafted as art. 35.1 UNCITRAL arbitral rules of procedures 
and conferred upon the arbitrators the right to “decide the dispute […] in accordance 
with such rules of law, whether national or international, as it shall determine to be 
applicable”28. Such an open formula was framed in the first ICSID Convention draft 
where the version of the arbitral clause mentioned that art. 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice was a tool to be used to find the applicable law.  
However, while negotiating the final version of the ICSID Convention, a major 
political change occurred and the version that it is now in force was accepted.  
                                               
25 See the BITs signed between Canada and: Armenia, Barbados, Croatia, Ecuador, Egypt, Latvia, Lebanon, Panama, 
Philippines, South Africa, Romania, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukraine and Venezuela. 
 
26 See Duke Energy Electroquil Partners & Electroquil S.A. v. Republic of Ecuador, quoted, par. 196. 
 
27 See Schreuer C., (2011); Reinisch A. (2008). 
 
28 Working Paper in the form of draft Convention (June 5, 1962) in: Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between State and Nationals of Other States: Documents Concerning the Origin and the Formulation of the Convention 19, 
21 International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes 1968. 
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Contrary to the “original” version, the one now in force represents a “compromise” 
29. It reduces the arbitral tribunal’s power to determine the applicable law, whilst 
preserving its freedom to apply international law. In fact, art. 42.(1) second alinea 
sets boundaries while identifying the set of laws within which arbitrators are required 
to make their choice.  
Given this, the interpretation and application of art. 42.(1) second alinea raises much 
concern because the relationship between the host state’s law and the international 
law is unclear. Namely, it is still much-debated whether the two corpora iuridica are 
applicable together or as alternatives or, whether one plays a primary role over the 
other.  
The issue is easy to understand because it derives from the wording of the 
Convention itself: according to art. 42.(1) ICSID, in the absence of any express 
choice of law, the arbitrators apply the contracting parties’ national law and 
international law. However, it is not clear what role the Convention’s committee had 
in mind for international law. Since the early stages of the Convention’s application, 
it was unclear whether arbitrators could decide to apply international law alone, 
instead of the host state’s national law; or, whether they were bound to limit the 
application of international law. Given this uncertainty, earlier arbitral case law 
praxis applied international law only in a limited way.   
Namely, the decision of the ad hoc Committee in the Klöckner v. Republic of 
Cameroon annulment proceeding gave birth to the theory that international law could 
play only a supplementary or a corrective role with respect to national law.  
In detail, in the Klöckner annulment decision, the ad hoc Committee was required to 
understand whether or not the arbitral tribunal had manifestly exceeded its power 
when choosing the law to apply. Indeed, the arbitral tribunal had applied “other 
national codes” along with “the universal requirements of frankness and loyalty”30. 
While questioning the legitimacy of the application of these principles of 
international law, the ad hoc Committee also highlighted that art. 42.(1) second 
alinea, legitimized the application of international principles of law conferring them: 
“a twofold role, that is, complementary (in the case of a "lacuna" in the law of the 
State), or corrective, should the State's law not conform on all points to the principles 
of international law. In both cases, the arbitrators may have recourse to the 
"principles of international law" only after having inquired into and established the 
content of the law of the State party to the dispute and after having applied the 
relevant rules of the State's law ”31. According to the ad hoc Committee, the arbitral 
tribunal had correctly applied the above sources of law, given that they were part of 
the “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations”32.  
                                               
29 See Broches A. (1967), at 16. 
 
30 See Klöckner v. United Republic of Cameroon, ICSID case ARB/81/2, decision of the ad hoc Committee in the annulment 
procedure, 21st October 1983, para 66. 
 
31 Id. para 61.  
 
32 Id. para 69. 
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Since then, arbitrators have conferred a residual role upon international law. 
In more detail, international law is used in a supplementary way when arbitrators 
decide to apply national law as the proper law but they find that the latter has a 
lacuna. However, this approach seems to be grounded on a false premise for two 
reasons. Firstly, international law cannot be used to fill all, alleged, gaps of the 
national legal system involved - if the latter does not provide any remedies for a 
certain act or measure this does not necessarily represent a lacuna. On the contrary, 
it might reflect the state’s choice not to regulate a certain matter33.   Secondly, the 
lacuna only truly exists if there is a socio-legal lag34when, for instance, the state is 
ready, or is about to, regulate a certain matter but it has not enacted any regulations 
yet. Given this case, national legal systems do frequently have general principles and 
customary provisions to cover legal positions not yet regulated by a specific domestic 
provision. Therefore, even in the case of an alleged lacuna, arbitrators should first 
scrutinize whether the relevant matter is otherwise provided for within the domestic 
legal framework itself. Then, only in the case of a negative answer, should the 
arbitrators look at international law.  This line of reasoning is grounded in legal logic, 
however,  it  confers a wide discretion upon the arbitrator. In practice, international 
law will be applied in a supplementary way depending on how thoroughly arbitrators 
have scrutinized the national legal system. This means that international law is 
applicable only if arbitrators have not found any domestic principles to fill the gap, 
notwithstanding how closely arbitrators have scrutinized the domestic legal system. 
In addition, a general consideration seems unavoidable: if international law is used 
to fill a national legal system gap, arbitrators might find the host state in breach of 
an international law provision. The result would be that national and international 
law would then be interchangeable. But this is not the case. As a matter of principle, 
national and international provisions have two distinct ambits of application: national 
law regulates interindividual relationships, while international law regulates states as 
sovereign entities governing the international community.  In cases where arbitrators 
apply the national law only, they will not question the international responsibility of 
the State and this will be the case even where state international responsibility exists. 
As such, the alleged supplementary role of international law, as left to arbitral 
discretion, should be avoided.  
Besides, international law is allegedly playing a corrective role when the application 
of national law turns out to be in conflict with a principle of international law. This 
interpretation relies on an early interpretation of ICSID Convention art. 42.(1) (then 
art. 45) provided by the Convention Committee working on the ICSID travaux: “the 
laws of the host country would be of primary importance and that international law 
itself would in the first place refer to them” 35. According to the Committee, 
arbitrators should first apply domestic law; secondly, domestic law had to be tested 
                                               
33 Weil, P. (2000). 
 
34   Reisman W. M. (2000), p. 371. 
 
35 See the Summary Proceedings of the Legal Committee Meeting, December the 7th, in 2 ICSID Documents, p. 804.  
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against international law. If the result was a conflict with international law, then the 
former could not be applied.  
This conclusion is not convincing. In fact, the ICSID Convention should be 
interpreted according to the relevant international law provisions; namely, art. 31 of 
VCLT states that a “treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the contract”. Only in the case of an 
obscure result, might one recur to the supplementary means of interpretation referred 
in art, 32 VCLT. Given the clear wording of art. 42.(1), the need to return to the 
history of the ICSID Convention to interpret it, is doubtful. Instead, one should 
question when the domestic law provision applicable to a dispute will result in a 
conflict with a principle of international law, so making international law applicable 
in a corrective way. 
If one follows a broad interpretation of conflict, art. 42.(1) ICSID would be deprived 
of any meaning because such an interpretation would make international law 
applicable only at the arbitrator’s discretion. Therefore, a clear distinction between 
what is a conflict and what is a difference between an international and a domestic 
provision is much needed. The ICSID committee clearly had in mind the set of 
provisions that could not be infringed by domestic law application. While negotiating 
an early draft of the Convention, reference was made to art. 53 of the VCLT36. 
According to this, a conflict exists only when the application of a national law results 
in a contrast with an international provision of jus cogens37. However, this rule does 
not provide a practical example, it has merely a prescriptive nature (that a treaty is 
void when it conflicts with a provision of international law). The International Law 
Commission (ILC), in the commentary on the Vienna Convention draft articles, 
refused to make a list of jus cogens rules. According to the ILC: “the full content of 
this rule [the jus cogens ones] is to be worked out in State practice and in 
jurisprudence of international tribunal […]”. No specification is then needed ex ante 
because “first, the mention of some cases of treaties for conflict with a rule of jus 
cogens might, even with the most careful drafting, lead to misunderstanding as to the 
position concerning other cases not mentioned in the article. Secondly, if the 
commission were to attempt to draw up […] a list of the rules of international law 
which are to be regarded as having the character of jus cogens, it might find engaged 
in a prolonged study”38. Absent any further indication, one has to adapt the ILC 
reasoning to art. 42.(1) second alinea. As a consequence, the conclusion can be 
reached that the arbitral tribunals receive their power from an international treaty (the 
investment ones). As such, they are organs of international law and they cannot apply 
any domestic law provision which results in a contrast with a fundamental value 
protected within the International Community.  
                                               
36 Villiger M.E. (2008), pp. 661. 
 
37See Kolb, R. (2015); Villiger M.E. (2008); Veedross A. (1966). 
 
38 See United Nations Conference on the Law of the Treaties, Official Records, Documents of the Conference, 67-68, UN 
Doc. A/CONF.39/11/Add.2 (1971). 
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With regards to the early arbitral praxis, for a long time after the Klöckner annulment 
decision, arbitral tribunals applied international law either in a supplementary or 
corrective way, without even distinguishing between contracts and treaty claims, 
which require different treatment 39.  
This reference to previous decisions proves also that the doctrine of precedent plays 
a role within the arbitral praxis40. Even if ICISID arbitral tribunals are not bound by 
other decisions they often do, in practice, rely on precedent41.  
From the above, it can be derived that the use of international law in a supplementary 
or corrective way has a purely jurisprudential nature and, as already stated, has no 
legal basis; neither in the wording of art. 42.(1) nor in the travaux of the 
Convention42. 
This leads to the conclusion that, for a long time, ICSID art. 42.(1) has been 
improperly interpreted, following the interpretation given by the Convention 
Committee and later confirmed in early case law.  
 
5. ICSID CASE LAW: FROM KLÖCKNER TO WENA HOTELS V. EGYPT  
 
The jurisprudential approach towards the interpretation of art. 42.(1) second alinea 
was first eroded by the ICSID tribunal in Siemens AG v. Argentine Republic, when 
the arbitral tribunal refused to consider that international law played, in the 
alternative, a supplementary or a corrective role43. According to the tribunal, given 
that the case arose out of the alleged treaty infringement committed by Argentina 
“the Tribunal’s inquiry is governed by the [ICSID] Convention, by the [BIT] and by 
applicable international law. Argentina’s domestic law constitutes evidence of the 
measures taken by Argentina and of Argentina’s conduct in relation to its 
commitments under the [BIT]”44. 
Afterwards, this line of reasoning was also embraced by the ad hoc Committee in 
Wena Hotels LTD v. the Arab Republic of Egypt annulment proceeding. In this case, 
the ad hoc Committee stated that: “[art.42.1] allowed for both [domestic and 
international] legal orders to have a role. The law of the host State can indeed be 
applied in conjunction with international law if this is justified. So too international 
law can be applied by itself if the appropriate rule is found in this other ambit”45.  
                                               
39See supra note 7. See Amco Asia Corporation and others v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Decision 
on the Application for Annulment, May 16, 1986. 
 
 
40 Schereuer C., Weiniger M. (2008), p. 1191.  
 
41 See Letco v. Liberia, Awards, 31 March 1986, 2 ICSID Reports 1986, 352. 
 
42 See supra note n. 7. 
 
43 Siemens AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID case n. ARB/02/8, award of 6 February 2007. 
 
44  Id. 78.  
 
45 Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID case n. 98/4, award of 8 December 2000. 
 
13 
 
The rationale behind the decision is easy to understand. One of the grounds for 
requesting the annulment concerned the manifest excess of power used by the arbitral 
tribunal. In actual fact, the failure to apply the proper law may constitute a manifest 
excess of power. In this case, according to the applicant, the arbitral tribunal had 
failed to apply international law as the primary law (namely the agreement for the 
promotion and protection of investments signed between the United Kingdom (the 
investor home state) and Egypt). The ad hoc Committee rejected the applicant’s 
request as, according to the ad hoc Committee, the arbitral tribunal’s finding on the 
wording of ICSID art. 42.(1) was to be followed. The use of may, along with the 
conjunction and, leads to two concurrent options for application: either national and 
international rules are applied in tandem or they are applied autonomously. 
Therefore, international rules can too be considered as a set of autonomous rules 
which may supersede national law. There can also be cases where the arbitral tribunal 
finds both a national and an international law provision equally applicable, then it is 
up to the arbitral tribunal itself to decide to apply the latter as the proper law, without 
the need for any further justification. According to this, in the Wena Hotel annulment 
proceeding, art. 42.(1) ICSID was interpreted and applied as never before. 
In fact, for the first time, an ICSID ad hoc Committee had acknowledged that its 
scrutiny could actually trigger the host state’s international responsibility. This 
notwithstanding the fact that a measure abides by the host state’s domestic 
provisions. In other words, an “expropriatory” measure can be allowed by national 
law whilst at the same time infringing a provision on expropriation in the relevant 
investment agreement. It is needless to recall that investment treaties have an 
international nature, therefore one could also argue that international law might be 
applied as the proper law, notwithstanding art. 42.(1) ICSID. Indeed, art. 3 of the 
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
states that “The characterization of an act of a state as internationally wrongful is 
governed by international law. Such characterization is not affected by the 
characterization of the same act as lawful by internal law” 46. Therefore, to qualify 
as an act committed by a state towards a foreign investor, the international law should 
apply proprio vigore, notwithstanding how the national law concerned interprets it. 
Some scholars have strongly opposed the conclusion reached by the Wena ad hoc 
Committee on the assumption that it did not consider the amendment made by the 
Convention Committee between the early and the final drafts of the convention. In 
fact, the final version of art. 42.(1) ICSID drastically reduced arbitral tribunal 
freedom to determine which law to apply. The early draft provided that the “arbitral 
tribunal shall decide the dispute submitted to it in accordance with such rules of law, 
whether national or international, as it shall determine to be applicable” as already 
mentioned, the final version changed slightly, stating that “the Tribunal shall apply 
the law of the contracting State party to the dispute […]and such rules of 
international law as may be applicable”. Clearly, the first draft conferred much more 
                                               
46 See UN, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with commentaries, doc. A/56/10, 
in Yearbook of International Law Commission 2001, vol. II, Part Two. See Crawford J., p. 103 ss.; Ago R. (1971), par. 60 
ss. et 86 ss.  
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discretion upon arbitral tribunals; however, it is clear too that the final version still 
leaves it up to the tribunal to determine whether, and to what extent, international 
law shall apply.  
In this regard, the finding of the ad hoc Committee is of much interest because it has 
made the relationship clear between the national and international law that is 
potentially applicable to investor-state disputes. Namely, that the arbitral tribunal is 
allowed to determine the applicable law on a case by case basis, having also regard 
to the nature of claims. In the case of treaty claims, and in the absence of any optio 
legis, the tribunal can therefore apply international law as the proper law.  
In acknowledging the primary role of international law, the ad hoc Committee also 
implicitly acknowledged that investment treaties do create an autonomous legal 
system which does not exist in a vacuum but is linked to the international and national 
legal systems.  
Accordingly, all arbitral tribunals have to clearly distinguish between the host state 
and the investor position as derived out of the investment agreement. With regards 
to the former, the arbitral tribunal has to scrutinize the host state obligations, bearing 
in mind that they derive out of the investment treaty and have an international nature. 
With regards to the latter, arbitrators have to consider that the investment treaty’s 
legal system confers an active position upon the private investor towards the host 
state. Foreign investors do indeed have the power to seek protection against host state 
wrongdoing through the arbitral proceeding. As a consequence, it might be argued 
that ICSID art. 42(1) has a residual role to give evidence of the investor’s juridical 
position towards the host state. In this scenario, the foreign investor seems to be in a 
similar position (or even equal) to that of any European economic operator. Indeed, 
the EU legal system provides that its provisions are directly applicable to both the 
national and the administrative member state courts. Therefore, before these courts, 
individuals are allowed to seek protection for any member state’s alleged 
infringement of an EU provision. Investment treaties confer an equal prerogative 
upon investors who are allowed to bring a claim against the host State directly in 
front of the arbitral tribunal, even if the relevant source of law was agreed upon 
between the host state and the investor home state47.  
 
6. THE (POSSIBLE) COORDINATION OF INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN LAW: THE 
ARBITRAL PRAXIS ON INTRA-EU BITS 
 
The Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009 amending, amongst others, art. 207 of 
TFEU. The new version of the article also conferred, upon the members of the 
European Common Commercial Policy (CCP), competence for foreign direct 
investments (FDI)48. According to art. 3.(1) TFEU therefore, the EU has exclusive 
competence for CCP and, since 2009, the EU has started to shape its own policy on 
                                               
47 Crespi Reghizzi Z. (2009), p. 24; Rigaux M., (1984), p. 504. 
 
48 See Dr. G…. v. German Bundestag, Bundesveraffsungsgericht, in case 2BvE 2/08, decision of 30th Jun 2009 
(https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/2009/06/es20090630_2bve000208en.pdf?__blob=p
ublicationFile&v=1); Meunier S. (2016) ; Mola L. (2010); Leczykiewicz D. (2005); Puig V. (2013). 
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FDI, working on two-level fields: on one side, the EU has tackled the issue of both 
the extra and the intra-EU BITs already in-force; on the other, the EU has opened 
negotiations for concluding investment agreements with third countries in a mixed49 
or in a bilateral way.  
The main issue that has been tackled has concerned the legitimacy of the arbitral 
clause. Accordingly, maintaining the arbitral clause, within the intra-EU BITs, has 
been questioned. In parallel, doubts have been raised regarding the opportunity to 
include an arbitral clause within the new EU trade and investment agreements.   
The reason behind the EU’s hostile approach towards the investor-state arbitral 
proceedings is clear: EU law interpretation and application is an ECJ prerogative (see 
artt. 252 ss. TFEU). Therefore, any potential arbitral tribunal’s scrutiny of EU law 
should be avoided or, at least, made compatible with the ECJ prerogative.  
The next paragraph will deal with the intra-EU BITs, leaving the issue concerning 
the new European trade and investment agreements to the proceeding one. 
With regards to the intra-EU BITs, the member states agreed, in October 2019, on a 
plurilateral treaty for the termination of bilateral investment treaties50. This treaty is 
the result of almost a decade of debate on the legitimacy of maintaining the intra-EU 
BITs already in force. The treaty’s aim is to coordinate the termination of the intra-
EU BITs without unduly impairing foreign investors and also provides some specific 
provisions with regards to pending, or already initiated, arbitral proceedings.  
In fact, since 2009 the intra-EU BITs have been the object of numerous arbitral 
proceedings. In addition, EU investors have raised arbitral proceedings against a 
member state for alleged infringement of the ECT’ investment chapter 51.  
In both scenarios, the facts have been almost the same: the investor has claimed that 
its investment has been impaired by a measure enacted by the host state. While the 
latter, being both the host and a member state, has replied that it has acted in 
accordance with an EU obligation.  If one assumes the European union perspective, 
the relationship between international and European law should mirror the one 
existing between the EU and its member states: it has to be read in the light of the 
theory of limits and counter-limits52. As such, international law enters the European 
union system provided its provisions abide by the European public order53. In other 
words, international law must abide by the “very foundations of the Community legal 
order” 54. This conclusion changes if we adopt the member state’s perspective. Given 
                                               
49 Neframi E. (2002); Kujper P. (1995); Stein E. (1990), at 162. 
 
50 See supra note 6. 
 
51  Tietje C. (2008).  
 
52 Eeckhout P. (2011), p. 435; A. von Bogdandy A., Kottman M., Antphöler C., et al. (2012). 
 
53 See Kadi e Al Baraakat International Foundation v. the Council and the Commission, ECJ in cases C-402/05 & C-
425/05, judgement of 3 September 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:461, par. 285; see Wessel R. (2011), Gaja, (2009); Tietje 
(2008).  
 
54 See the Opinion delivered pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 228 (1) of the Treaty - draft agreement between 
the Community, on the one hand, and the countries of the European Free Trade Association, on the other, relating to the 
creation of the European Economic Area, ECJ Opinion delivered in case C-1/91on 14 December 1991, ECLI:EU:C:1991:490. 
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that all member states are bound to comply with European law as well as with their 
international obligations, it is essential to understand what rank the provisions 
assume within the domestic legal system55. In fact, European law primauté and, as 
the case may be, its direct application, operate only towards member state national 
law56.  
However, the content of the two provisions at stake (one enacted in the investment 
treaty and the other in the European legal system) might be in alleged conflict and 
have equal rank within domestic sources of law57. 
In all the proceedings so far mentioned, the arbitral tribunals have concluded that the 
member state measure infringed the BIT or the ECT provision, regardless of whether 
or not the measure enacted by the state complied with an EU obligation itself. In 
other words, the legitimacy of the state measure with European union law has not 
even been taken into consideration.  
What is of interest, in the present analysis, is how arbitral tribunals have reasoned on 
the lex applicable issue and therefore on the role that the EU should have played. 
Firstly, it should be highlighted that arbitrators have never directly applied EU law. 
Instead, they have focused on the possible application of the European union 
provision as part of either the national or the international legal system. In fact, at 
least from a theoretical perspective European law provisions could be applied in both 
scenarios. However, the praxis has shown that applying provisions as part of the 
international or the national legal system produces different legal effects. 
With regards to the former, when European law applies as part of international law 
its application has the same boundary as that referred above regarding the possible 
application of national law: namely, the European union provisions must abide by 
the principles of international law58. This boundary can be easily understood because 
the European legal system is subject to all the rules that apply to the international 
legal system, of which the European union is a part. In this regard, the arbitral 
tribunal in Electrabel v. Hungary held that "all [european] legal rules are part of a 
regional system of international law and therefore have an international legal 
character"59.  
                                               
See also ERT, ECJ decision in case C-260/89, of 18 June 1982, ECLI:EU:C:1991:254; Schimderberger, ECJ decision in case  
C-112/00 of 12 June  2003, ECLI:EU:C:2003:33; Omega Spielhallen, ECJ decision in case  C-36/02 of 14 October 2004, 
ECLI:EU:C:2004:614. 
 
55 Von Bogdandy A. (2008), pp. 397-413. 
 
56 See Bermann G. (2016) at 434; see also, Klabbers J. (2011); Flaminio Costa v. Enel, ECJ case C-6/64, judgment of 15thJuly 
1964, ECLI:EU:C:1964:66. 
 
57 See Lenaerts K. (2015). 
  
58 See U.N. ILC, doc. A/CN.4/L.682, Fragmentation of international law: difficulties arising from the diversification and 
expansion of international law, report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, Finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi, 13th April 2006, paras. 243-250. 
 
59 Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and 
Liability, 30th November 2012, para 4.122.  
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Besides, in the Achmea (formerly Eureko) case, the arbitral tribunal legitimized the 
reference to European law assuming that " in principle the EU legal doctrines, 
including those of supremacy, precedence, direct effect, direct applicability is part 
of the EU law that might fall to be applied by the Tribunal in this case under art. 8.6 
of the BIT "60. The arbitral tribunal also stated that its jurisdiction was based on the 
BIT, therefore the consequences of applying European law must be assessed "within 
the framework of the rules of international law and not in disregard of those rules”61. 
As a consequence, European union law provisions could potentially be applied when 
a disputed arbitral clause enacted within the investment treaty provides that "the law 
in force of the contracting party concerned, the provisions of this agreement, and 
other relevant agreements between the contracting parties and the principle of 
international law"62. 
With regards to the second option, when European union law has been applied as 
part of domestic law, the arbitral tribunals have applied it as a fact. As such, EU law 
has been used to frame the circumstances of the case, assisting judges engaged in 
hermeneutic interpretive activities. Therefore, European law has become an 
instrument for identifying the substantive rules that are suitable for the case. In AES 
v. Hungary, the tribunal highlighted that the agreement between the parties (the ECT) 
provided a clause according to which the law applicable to an arbitral dispute would 
be the ECT provisions along with the principles of international law. Given this, the 
arbitral tribunal acknowledged that EU law should be considered as a fact: 
"Community law, including Community competition law, is considered the 
equivalent of internal or municipal law for the purpose of the proceeding. 
Community law is thus merely a fact to be considered by the tribunal when 
determining the law applicable "63.  
The award was later subject to an annulment proceeding. Amongst the grounds for 
the annulment, the applicant claimed that the arbitrators had manifestly exceeded 
their powers.  According to the applicant, the arbitral tribunal omitted to question the 
legality of the contested measure under both Hungarian and EU law. However, the 
ad hoc Committee claimed that "the question of legality under Hungarian and EU 
law was a significant issue in the original proceedings […]"64. However, even if 
European law had been applied, the outcome of the dispute would not have changed 
because, according to the ad hoc Committee: "had Hungary been motivated to 
reintroduce price regulation with a view to addressing the EC's state aid concerns, 
there is no doubt that this would have constituted a rational public policy measure"65. 
                                               
60 Achmea B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, PCA Case No. 2008-13 (formerly Eureko B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, Award on 
Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension, 26th October 2010, par. 289. 
 
61 Id. para. 229. 
 
62 Id. para 231. 
 
63 Aes Summit Generation Limited and Aes-Tisza Eromu Kft v. the Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, 
award, 23rd September 2010, para. 7.3.4. 
 
64 AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü kft v. The Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, 
Decision of the ad hoc Committee on the Application for annulment, 29th December 2012, para. 162. 
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In Electrabel v. Hungary the arbitral tribunal came to an analogous conclusion when 
reasoning on the dual potential application of EU law. According to the arbitrators, 
European union law can be applied as part of the international legal system when the 
arbitral clause states that a dispute shall be decided with “the law in force of the 
contracting party concerned, the provisions of this agreement, and other relevant 
agreements between the contracting parties and the principle of international law”.  
Viceversa, “EU law must in any event be considered as part of the Respondent’s 
national legal order, i.e. to be treated as a “fact” before this international tribunal” 
66.  As a consequence, when arbitrators apply European law as a fact, they implicitly 
limit their scrutiny on the European judicial order. Such an approach is not a new 
one and seems to reveal a monistic approach which favors the international legal 
system’s sources of law67.  
In all the above-mentioned cases, arbitrators scrutinized the measure adopted by the 
respondent state without questioning the measure’s legitimacy under EU law. To 
reach the conclusion that the international obligation enacted in the investment treaty 
applies, notwithstanding the European Union ones, arbitral tribunals have applied 
international rules on treaties enacted in the VCLT (art. 30.3 and art. 59) along with 
the principles of customary law enacted by the ILC report on the Fragmentation of 
International Law68. This legal reasoning seems to be the correct one, also because 
in no case have the parties been able to prove that the obligations enacted in the 
investment treaty and in the European treaties were in real conflict (meaning that the 
two provisions could not have been applied contemporarily). Therefore, the host-
member states were not bound by two equally applicable provisions. The arbitrators 
have thus avoided getting involved in the debate concerning whether or not the 
international legal system will supersede the European one or viceversa. This debate 
is still open and it may arise again in the pending arbitral disputes on intra-EU BIT 
or the ECT. If a real conflict arises between the content of the two provisions one 
could expect two solutions, depending on the approach that the arbitrators follow. 
In the first solution, the arbitral tribunal, when it is possible, will solve the conflict 
by finding a balance between the obligations enacted under the relevant international 
and European provisions. In other words, excluding an isolationist approach 
(according to which a source of law, rectius the legal system within which it has been 
enacted, must be interpreted as being disconnected from others) arbitrators should 
follow a systematic evolutionary interpretation. They have therefore to interpret the 
                                               
65 Id. para. 172. 
 
66 Electrabel v. Ungheria, quoted, par. 4.127 ss.. 
 
67 See German Interest in Polish Upper Silesia v. Poland, Permanent Court of International Justice, judgement of 25 august 
1925, PCIJ (ser. A) no. 6, p.19; see also, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, 
WTO AB in case WT/DS50/AB/R decision  of 16 April 1999, paras. 65-66. 
 
68 See supra note 57. 
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obligations enacted within the provisions in mutual support of one another69. This 
approach finds legitimacy in articles 31.1 and 31.3. (c) of the Vienna Convention of 
the Law of Treaties, 1969. 
On the other side, the arbitral tribunal can let the European provision prevail in a case 
where the defendant host-member state’s enacted measure abides by the European 
public order70. In this situation, arbitrators will always reject the exceptions regarding 
European law primauté as this prerogative only applies to internal relations between 
the EU and the member states.  
 
7. … follow : THE ARBITRAL CLAUSE IN THE NEW EU INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 
 
Since the European union was given competence over FDI, it has started to frame its 
own investment policy with third countries71. Accordingly, the EU has opened 
investment treaty negotiations with all potential partners. To date, some negotiations 
have been suspended due to political reasons (such as TTIP); some are still pending 
(see EU-Singapore and EU-Vietnam) and some have been concluded already 
(CETA)72.  
Each negotiation has its peculiarities; however, all have raised much debate – still 
open – also with regard to the opportunity to include an arbitral clause. Indeed, the 
EU’s concern has always been to preclude non-EU forum from interpreting and 
applying European union law.  Both these prerogatives are conferred, as mentioned 
above, upon the ECJ. 
The so called “Micula saga” represents well the efforts made by the EU Commission 
to avoid intra-EU arbitral proceedings, even at the cost of precluding, due to 
illegitimacy, a member state from enforcing an arbitral award which might 
potentially have led to a conflict with an EU provision73. Particularly, in this case, 
according to the Commission, the enforcement of the award would have been equal 
to state aid74.  
However, it seems the risk feared by the Commission is more political than legal. 
Firstly, the arbitral clause framed in the investment agreement does not allow the 
                                               
69 See Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskai Ur  v. The argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/26, award, 8th December 2016, par 1154. See Vadi V. (2015); Crema L. (2013); Crawford J. (2013); Sands C., 
(1998). 
 
70 See Eco Swiss, ECJ Judgement C-126/97 of 1st June 1999, ECLI:EU:C:1999:269, para. 31; de Lange R. (2007); von 
Bogdandy A. (2006), Weiler J.H.H. (1999). 
 
71 Castellarin E. (2013); Peterson L. (2011). 
 
72 See https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/negotiations-and-agreements/#_pending  
 
73 See Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula, S.C. European Food S.A., S.C., Starmill S.r.l. and Multipack S.r.l. v. Romania, ICSID 
case No. ARB/05/20, Award, 11 December 2013. 
 
74See European Commission Letter to Romania on State Aid investigation, 1st October 2014; European Commission, 
decision of 30 March 2015 concerning the aid of State SA.38517 (2014/C) (ex 2014/NN) implemented by Romania – Arbitral 
award Micula v. Romania of 11 December 2013, in C- 2015/1470, in: Eu. Un. Of. Jour.  n. L. 232/43; see also the UKSC, 
Judgment, Micula and others v. Romania, [2020] UKSC 5, 19 February 2020, para 118.  
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arbitral tribunal to scrutinize and rule on the legitimacy, or not, of an EU law 
provision. Secondly, any arbitral mistake in applying or failing to apply, EU law can 
be amended if the recognition and the execution of the award is requested. In fact, 
such proceedings are raised in front of member state domestic courts which, 
according to art. 267 TFEU75, do have the power to request the ECJ’s opinion on the 
final and definitive interpretation to give to a European law.  
Given the above-mentioned political scenario, the legitimacy of the arbitral clause 
has been the object of ECJ scrutiny. Namely, in the Achmea decision the Court 
denied the maintenance into force of the arbitral clause in the intra-EU BITs (not the 
ECT). According to the ECJ: “[…]  in order to ensure that the specific 
characteristics and the autonomy of the EU legal order are preserved, the Treaties 
have established a judicial system intended to ensure consistency and uniformity in 
the interpretation of EU law […] by concluding the BIT, the Member States parties 
to it established a mechanism for settling disputes which could prevent those disputes 
from being resolved in a manner that ensures the full effectiveness of EU law”76.  
This notwithstanding that, to date, as shown in the above paragraph, an arbitral 
tribunal has not questioned the legitimacy of an EU provision. This decision has 
raised a debate about whether or not the new EU investment agreement should have 
dealt with the issue on arbitral proceedings and applicable law. 
As a result, in the new European investment agreements, the negotiators have framed 
arbitral clauses balancing two necessities: the European union’s hostility towards 
intra-EU investor-state arbitral proceedings and third-countries’ refusal to get rid of 
arbitral proceedings.  
In this paragraph, we will limit the analysis to the arbitral clause enacted within the 
CETA; namely, art. 8.31 confer upon arbitrators the right to determine the disputes 
according to the agreement provisions, along with the rules or the principles of the 
international law which may result applicable. Also, paragraph 2 provides that: “the 
Tribunal shall not have jurisdiction to determine the legality of a measure, alleged 
to constitute a breach of this Agreement, under the domestic law of the disputing 
Party. For greater certainty, in determining the consistency of a measure with this 
Agreement, the Tribunal may consider, as appropriate, the domestic law of the 
disputing Party as a matter of fact”77. 
From the clause’s wording, two conclusions might be derived. 
The clause works as an express optio legis, given that parties have determined which 
rules of law must be applied if a dispute arises. Any reference to EU law is absent; 
therefore, the arbitrators might use it only as a fact. This limitation in turn precludes 
any incorrect interpretation and application of European union law. Also, the arbitral 
clause’s second paragraph seems to go a step further: it states that the arbitrators 
cannot determine the legality of the relevant measure by applying the host-member 
                                               
75 Paschalidis (2016); Szpunar M. (2017), p. 85 ss.. 
 
76 Slovak Republic v. Achmea B.V., ECJ case C-284/16, 6th march 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018;158, paras. 32-33 and 56.  
 
77 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European union and its Member States, 
in OJ L. 11, 14.1.2017.   
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state’s domestic law. Once again, this means that domestic law can be used only as 
a fact, interpreted in line with how it is applied by domestic legislators and courts.  
As such, the clause seems to mirror the European approach towards investor State 
arbitral proceedings. Once it was realized that Europe could not force third parties to 
negotiate an investment agreement without an arbitral clause, European union 
negotiators have found a way to frame them in a European-acceptable way. It is 
worthwhile mentioning the recent ECJ Opinion n. 1/17 where the Court stated that 
the arbitral clause enacted within the CETA is compatible with EU Law 78.  
European union negotiators have endorsed an equal approach in the UNCITRAL 
Committee constituted to establish procedural rules for an international investment 
court79. In pursuing this path, the EU is somehow legitimizing the primacy played by 
international law in its external investment relations. 
 
8. CONCLUSION  
This analysis has tried to reopen the debate on an old issue. Indeed, the question 
concerning the lex applicable to investor-state arbitral proceedings has always been 
the object of close scrutiny. This is because arbitral tribunals are detached from any 
legal system and so, from any national provisions. As such, determining the 
applicable law represents a delicate task. The main difficulties arise when the parties 
have not made an express choice of law. In these circumstances, arbitral tribunals are 
required to determine the applicable law by following what is stated in the arbitral 
clause. In this regard, ICSID art. 42.(1) has, for a long time, caught the attention of 
both academics and the case law praxis. The debate has mostly concerned the role 
played by international law itself along with the relationship between international 
law and national law. As seen, originally international law played a supplementary 
or a corrective role with respect to national law. Only after the ad hoc Committee’s 
decision in the Wena Hotels annulment proceeding, has international law started to 
be applied autonomously as the proper law.  
In fact, this should have been the approach since early case law. Treaty claims arise 
out of an international agreement - a BIT or a multilateral investment treaty. As such, 
treaty provisions should be interpreted and applied within their own legal system. 
This, at the cost of favoring a monistic approach according to which international 
law supersedes national law, not viceversa.  
This analysis has attempted to show that the debate on the lex applicable within 
investor-state arbitral proceedings has been complicated by the “entrance” of a third 
system of law. In this respect, reference was made to the numerous arbitral 
proceedings arising out of either an intra-EU BIT or the ECT. These proceedings 
have raised questions about the role European law should play with respect to 
                                               
78 Opinion 1/17 of the Court, ECJ 30th April 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:341. 
 
79See Establishing a standing mechanism for the settlement of international investment disputes, Submission of the European 
union and its Member States to UNCITRAL Working Group III, 18th January 2019. See: 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/3Investor_State.html.  
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international and national law. Absent any express choice, European law could be 
applicable as part of international law or, as part of national law. In other words, 
European union law provisions could have easily been included within the 
functioning of the ICSID art. 42(1).  
However, recent praxis has shown that, in the arbitral proceedings arising out of 
intra-EU BITs or out of the ECT, the arbitrators have not questioned the legitimacy 
of host state measures with respect to the EU provision allegedly binding it. In fact, 
legitimacy was not an issue because arbitrators applied the international law 
provisions enacted within the treaty. Notwithstanding this, the European institutions 
have recently reached the goal of getting rid of intra-EU arbitral proceedings: the 
plurilateral treaty on intra-EU BIT termination, above all, will preclude the arisal of 
any future arbitral disputes concerning alleged conflict between an EU and an 
international provision. Within the internal market, the European union’s monistic 
approach has then prevailed, in which the European union obligations are above the 
international investment one. Contrarily, with regards to external relations, the EU 
has had to accept the inclusion of arbitral clauses in new European union trade and 
investment agreements. The clauses so far enacted have been framed in a European-
acceptable way, thus avoiding any incertitude with regards to the role – absent – of 
EU law. 
From this, a general conclusion can be attempted. International law and the 
international legal system are becoming primary law in each and every investor-state 
arbitral proceeding even when the relationship concerns the EU and third countries.  
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